There is a perception in foreign policy circles that despite the unpredictability and sweeping changes in U.S. foreign policy toward allies and partners under President Donald Trump, the Philippines remains one of the few countries firmly aligned with Washington, as ASEAN member states calibrate their positions between the world’s superpower and the region’s dominant power – China.
Recent research reinforces this perception. In the latest State of Southeast Asia public opinion survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Philippine respondents chose the U.S. over China by the widest margin among ASEAN member-states – 77 percent versus 23 percent – when forced to pick between the two powers. The 2026 report also showed that across Southeast Asia as a whole, China emerged as the preferred choice over the U.S., a reversal of the Institute’s 2025 findings.
The Southeast Asia Influence Index 2025 by Sydney’s Lowy Institute similarly found that while China holds greater influence over the U.S. in the majority of ASEAN member states, the Philippines, alongside Singapore and Timor-Leste, was among the few countries where the U.S. ranked higher across all five measures of influence: economic relationships, defense networks, cultural influence, diplomatic relationships, and regional engagement.
These findings underpin the prevailing narrative that as Southeast Asian nations drift toward Beijing or carefully manage great power competition, the Philippines remains steadfastly in the American column. That characterization, however, tells only part of the story. Recent developments suggest that the Philippines has not forgotten how to hedge. While maintaining its alliance commitments with Washington, Manila has been sending deliberate signals of a more nuanced foreign policy posture – one shaped by its awareness of the evolving strategic environment and the demands of its own national interests.
Firm on Sovereignty, Open to Engagement
Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has pursued a firm policy in defending its national interests, which has translated into a more assertive posture toward China than virtually any other ASEAN member state. The reality of Chinese coercion of Filipino fishermen and uniformed personnel in the West Philippine Sea has hardened public sentiment and sharpened Manila’s commitment to its maritime claims under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the 2016 arbitral ruling.
The Philippines’ transparency strategy has dominated the discourse whenever Philippines-China relations are discussed. But a firm position in the West Philippine Sea does not preclude strategic hedging elsewhere. In fact, it may require it, particularly when developments in the strategic environment demand a recalibration of Manila’s approach. This has resulted in a posture that actively maintains its U.S. alliance while keeping channels of engagement with Beijing open.
A tangible sign of this came in January, when the Philippines announced a 14-day visa-free entry arrangement for Chinese nationals, in line with the president’s directive to facilitate trade, investment, tourism, and people-to-people exchanges with Beijing. The one-year pilot could be read as a positive economic signal to Beijing amid the ongoing maritime dispute, consistent with the Philippines’ role as ASEAN chair for 2026. It is also a way for Manila to subtly communicate its willingness to separate the security dimension from the diplomatic and economic tracks of the relationship.
A more significant set of developments followed in late March. In a Bloomberg television interview, Marcos acknowledged that there would be a “very serious restructuring” of the Philippines’ relations with China and the need to “redraw” Manila’s international relationships amid shifting geopolitical realities. He also reiterated that the Philippines has always sought to differentiate its territorial disputes from its trade arrangements – a formulation that has long been the operating logic of Manila’s hedging strategy, albeit not previously stated openly.
Days after the Bloomberg interview, the Philippines and China convened the 24th Foreign Ministry Consultations and the 11th Meeting of the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea from March 27 to 28 in Quanzhou, Fujian Province. Both sides made progress on practical confidence-building measures, including coast guard communications, ocean meteorology, and initial exchanges on potential oil and gas collaboration. The previous Foreign Ministry Consultations were held in 2023, making the Quanzhou meetings a notable resumption of the high-level diplomatic engagement.
Practical Pressures and the ASEAN Chairmanship
These recent developments have unfolded against the backdrop of a global oil supply disruption triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The Philippine economy is reeling from the impact of this crisis, becoming the first country in the world to officially declare a state of national energy emergency in late March. In his Bloomberg interview, Marcos pointed to this disruption as a potential impetus for Manila and Beijing to explore joint oil and gas development in the South China Sea, framing an external crisis as an opening for greater bilateral engagement.
These economic openings carry added weight given the Philippines’ 2026 ASEAN chairmanship. The country assumed the chairmanship in January under the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together.” Leadership of ASEAN places Manila at the center of one of the region’s most consequential unresolved agenda items: a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Following the 48th ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Cebu earlier this month, Marcos reaffirmed that the Code of Conduct remains one of the Philippines’ core aspirations before the year ends.
Both the energy security component and the Code of Conduct hinge on a functional diplomatic relationship with Beijing, therefore providing a strong basis for the Philippines to pursue confidence-building measures in different areas of cooperation. As ASEAN chair, Manila also bears the responsibility of managing the regional bloc’s collective relationship with China – a role that demands engagement regardless of bilateral tensions.
An Alliance Intact, A Posture Evolving
Does this mean the Philippines is abandoning its alliance with the United States? Far from it. The Philippines-U.S. alliance remains at a high point since 2016. The two countries just concluded Balikatan 2026, the largest iteration of the annual exercises to date, involving 17,000 troops and representatives from five other partner nations. Prior to it, the United States announced the launch of a 4,000-Acre Economic Security Zone, which will be established in Luzon under the Pax Silica initiative. These are the most recent additions to a string of defense cooperation initiatives constituting the deepening security relationship between the two allies.
What the recent months suggest is that while Manila is honoring its alliance commitments, it is simultaneously adjusting to the demands of a shifting global landscape, and its evolving role in the regional security architecture, particularly when domestic pressures necessitate such recalibration.
U.S. foreign policy under the Trump administration has introduced a degree of unpredictability that even treaty allies must now seek actively to manage. For the Philippines, this means navigating a more complex security environment that requires recalibrating its economic posture and managing its relationships across bilateral and multilateral networks. The energy crisis has only sharpened Manila’s drive to explore all viable options in securing the country’s energy needs, providing a practical basis for engagement with Beijing that goes beyond the contentious maritime security situation.
The Philippines, in other words, is doing what smaller states have always done in navigating between major powers: drawing clear lines, standing firm on them, and preserving space to engage where interests allow it. Crucially, Manila has been clear that any move forward will be anchored in the country’s laws and will preserve its sovereignty and sovereign rights. What the Philippines is doing is a calculated hedge – a rational response when elements of uncertainty and volatility are introduced into its strategic calculus.
Disclaimer: all views expressed in this piece are solely of the author and do not, unless otherwise stated, necessarily reflect the official policy or position of institutions, organizations, affiliates, or any other individuals or entities to which he is associated.
