In the last two months, at least two Sufi shrines have come under attack by Islamist mobs in Bangladesh. The first was on April 11, when a Pir (spiritual leader) was beaten to death by a mob of around 300-400 people in an attack on a shrine in Kushtia in western Bangladesh. Then, on May 14, a mob vandalized the centuries-old shrine of Hazrat Shah Ali Baghdadi in Mirpur, Dhaka, where they beat people up with sticks.
The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, the country’s largest Islamist party, was allegedly involved in the two attacks. Although it has denied the allegations, evidence points in the direct of the Jamaat, which is now the main opposition party in Bangladesh.
Following the attack on the shrine in Mirpur on May 14, police arrested three men reportedly linked to the Jamaat based on video footage. Local parliamentarian Meer Ahmad Bin Qasem Arman, who was elected in the recent February 12 general elections on a Jamaat ticket, admitted that some of those arrested worked in his election campaign. Similarly, the murder of the Pir in Kushtia was reportedly led by a former district president of Chhatra Shibir, Jamaat’s student wing.
When they target Sufis, their places of worship and practices, Islamists often claim that their attacks are carried out in the name of the “Tauhidi Janata” (monotheistic masses).
Radical Islamists view the mystical and syncretic nature of Sufism as an intolerable deviation from their fundamentalist ideology. Hardliners consider the Sufi practices of visiting shrines, seeking intercession from saints, and playing devotional music (such as qawwali) to be bid’ah (an un-Islamic innovation) and a form of shirk (polytheism). Because Sufism emphasizes spiritual inclusivity, often integrating localized cultural traditions and attracting Hindus and Buddhists, Islamists view it Sufism as a threat to their monolithic worldview.
Since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, 2024, the violent targeting of shrines, Sufi institutions, and spiritual centers across Bangladesh has surged.
Several of these attacks are the work of the Jamaat, its leaders and activists.
During the 1971 Liberation War, the Jamaat-e-Islami was opposed to independence and collaborated with the Pakistan military in the horrific violence that was unleashed on the Bangladeshi people. Its leaders were convicted on charges of crimes against humanity by a special war crimes tribunal in Bangladesh.
In recent years, and especially in the run-up to the February general election, Jamaat leaders claimed the party had changed its position and supported Bangladesh’s emergence as an independent nation and promised to not seek to apply Shariah law. Importantly, they claimed to have adopted an inclusive ideology that was more accepting of Bangladesh’s religious minorities, even allowing a Hindu to contest on the Jamaat ticket. However, the Jamaat continues to target minorities violently.
Conflict Between Ideology and Political Strategy
Ideologically, Jamaat-e-Islami is a hardline Sunni Islamic political party inspired by the doctrines of Maulana Abul A’la Maududi. The party is opposed to Sufism, shrine culture, and Pir-centric religious practices. This ideological opposition is not new, but concern arises when it crosses into violence.
Viewed separately, the attacks on Sufis appear to be spontaneous expressions of religious anger. But the repetition of similar tactics, rhetoric, and organizational patterns raises several questions: Are these really isolated incidents, or part of a wider ideological and political project? Why is violence fueled by religious sentiment spreading so rapidly in Bangladesh? Many of these attacks on shrines, looting, and even killings happen in the full view of the administration.
Jamaat has long been accused of using religious sentiment as a tool of political mobilization. Its rhetoric frequently invokes themes such as “defending Islam,” “upholding morality,” or “protecting religious values.” But when such language contributes to violence, the issue moves beyond political discourse and becomes a matter of public security.
Mobilizing the public through religious sentiment increasingly functions as a political tool for the party. The process often begins with an allegation framed around religion, followed by organized mobilization and public incitement. Over time, this has become a recognizable pattern.
Rise of Mob Politics and Impunity
The rise of “mob justice” has become increasingly visible in Bangladesh, particularly after the fall of Hasina’s government and during the interim administration led by Dr. Muhammad Yunus. According to a recent study by the think-tank Maqam: Center for Sufi Heritage, at least 97 shrines were attacked over the 17 months when Yunus was at the helm. Three people were killed and 468 others were injured in these attacks.
Several attacks have involved bulldozing, arson, and looting. In Sherpur, the Murshidpur Darbar shrine was looted and burned in November 2024, while in Rajbari, the grave of “Nura Pagla,” a Sufi dervish, was exhumed and his remains burned in September 2025.
Reports from multiple incidents alleged the involvement of Jamaat leaders, alongside members of the ruling BNP and the National Citizen Party. In Sylhet, the centuries-old Urs festival at Shah Paran’s shrine was halted in September 2004, after madrasa students with local administrative support unleashed violence.
Despite the scale of the violence, only 11 cases were reportedly filed between August 2024 and February 2026, and most investigations have shown little progress. Video evidence circulated publicly, yet law enforcement agencies failed to act.
These attacks that target shrines, minorities, journalists, and cultural organizations reflect a larger cultural intolerance in the country. It appears that perpetrators of mob violence operate under political protection, often linked to Jamaat or allied groups. Repeated involvement of affiliated activists suggests tacit endorsement. Meanwhile, administrative inaction – even during attacks witnessed by police or security forces – has deepened public doubts about political pressure and impunity.
Which Path Is Bangladesh Taking?
If any group can repeatedly incite crowds to impose its ideology through violence, the issue threatens the social foundations of the state itself. Beyond being simply religious disputes, attacks on shrines strike at Bangladesh’s long tradition of cultural and social pluralism.
This is why Jamaat-e-Islami’s name repeatedly surfaces in discussions surrounding these attacks. The party’s ideological position, grassroots networks, and history of mobilizing religious sentiment consistently place it at the center of suspicion. Although direct party involvement may be difficult to prove in every case, the identities of those accused continue to reinforce public doubts.
History shows that once mob culture becomes normalized, it rarely remains under anyone’s control. An attack on a shrine today may become an attack on another religious or social group tomorrow. Unless political forces take a firm stand against violence, this cycle will continue.
