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The U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran – which began on 28 February 2026 – have effectively shut down the Strait of Hormuz, causing energy insecurity for the majority of Asia, notably China, India, South Korea, and Japan.
However, this current conflict could pose a strategic challenge to China, which has arguably been losing key sources of its fuel supply chain since the start of 2026. The first of these was Venezuela, which was severed following the U.S. capture of the country’s then-president, Nicolás Maduro. The second was Iran itself through the strikes, and the third is Hormuz.
It is unclear whether this sequence of events is a coordinated fuel supply chain attack strategy or a coincidence, but the structural effect on China’s energy security is functionally the same. One could see a scenario in which the U.S. perceives oil and gas as its lever to counter China’s dominance in critical minerals, but it may also be seen as a practical security tool (vis-à-vis Taiwan).
Instability in the Strait of Hormuz
China receives more oil through the Strait of Hormuz than any other country – roughly 37.7% of all crude transiting the waterway. Approximately 45–50% of China’s total crude imports pass through it. So, when tanker traffic collapsed by 83% within 24 hours of the strikes, the implications for Beijing were immediate.
However, one should be careful not to overstate China’s vulnerability in the short term. Beijing has been preparing for precisely this kind of disruption since the early 2010s. As of early March, China held approximately 1.39 billion barrels of oil in storage – enough for about 120 days of net imports at 2025 levels. There are also more than 46 million barrels of Iranian oil sitting in floating storage across Asia and in bonded tanks at Chinese ports.
Moreover, oil from the Gulf represents a smaller share of China’s total energy picture than headlines suggest. China’s energy mix is dominated by coal – roughly 52% – and renewables. By one estimate, oil transiting Hormuz accounts for only about 6% of China’s total energy consumption. China also produces around 27% of its oil domestically.
That said, the buffers have a shelf life. If the Strait remains disrupted for months rather than weeks, the picture shifts. China’s 2026 economic growth target of 4.5–5% – already its lowest since 1991 – will face real pressure if Middle Eastern imports stay constrained. The question is not whether China can survive a short disruption. It clearly can. The question is how a prolonged closure reshapes Beijing’s strategic calculations.
In this vein, one can see the Hormuz disruption accelerating interest in the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline from Russia. A sustained closure makes pipeline gas more attractive to Beijing, especially if it can secure pricing below the current Power of Siberia 1 contract rate. Every crisis that exposes the vulnerability of maritime chokepoints strengthens the case for overland alternatives – and Russia is the most obvious beneficiary.
Revisiting the National Security Strategy
To understand how the Iran war fits into Washington’s broader posture towards China, one has to start with the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2026 National Defence Strategy (NDS).
