President Donald Trump loves to make big, consequential decisions. And while the two of us don’t agree with many of his decisions, there is no doubt he has made some that benefit US national security. He established the US Space Force to respond the growing threats to our space systems, and has increased defense spending, advanced acquisition reform to deliver military capabilities quicker to our warfighters, and pressed allies to take defense seriously.
Now Trump has a chance to take action to improve the security of the United States over the long-term, and fix America’s broken nuclear weapons establishment.
The United States is entering the most fraught nuclear moment since the Cold War. Russia is modernizing and expanding its arsenal while openly brandishing nuclear threats. China is racing to build a far larger and more sophisticated nuclear force. Arms-control guardrails have collapsed. Nuclear deterrence is no longer an abstract concept — it is central to America’s future.
Yet America’s production and management of nuclear weapons are controlled by a system designed for a different era.
Today, responsibility for the US nuclear deterrent sits inside the Department of Energy. But it might be more accurate to say DOE sits inside the nuclear deterrent mission, as 76 percent of the fiscal 2027 budget request for DOE dedicated to defense. And yet, when discussion around the DOE occurs, it is never through the lens that it is a defense-focused department; rather the topics that dominate are climate policy, domestic energy programs or environmental cleanup.
Nuclear deterrence is not a regulatory exercise. It is not a social program. And it cannot compete for attention or funding with unrelated domestic priorities – but it does today. That is a flawed and, ultimately, dangerous setup, and it’s time to change it.
For most of the Cold War, America understood this. Nuclear weapons were managed by independent agencies — first the Atomic Energy Commission, then the Energy Research and Development Administration — whose sole mission was the design, production, and sustainment of the nuclear arsenal. Authority was clear. Accountability was direct. Results mattered.
That focus produced the most credible deterrent in history.
In 1977, that clarity was lost when nuclear weapons stewardship was folded into the Department of Energy. The consequences have been predictable: bureaucratic drag, blurred accountability, endless oversight, and constant budget battles between national security and domestic politics.
The creation of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in 2000 helped — but only partially. NNSA was built to maintain an existing stockpile, not to execute the large-scale modernization now urgently required. Over the past twenty-five years, its culture became one of risk avoidance and compliance, not speed, production, and delivery.
Under the leadership of current NNSA Administrator Brandon Williams, that culture is beginning to change. But the fundamental problem sits above the agency itself. At its core, this is an issue of institutional design — and NNSA will not reach its full potential unless it is made an independent agency, separate from the Department of Energy.
No other nuclear-armed nation runs its deterrent this way. That is why the President should work with Congress to remove NNSA from the Department of Energy and establish it as a stand-alone agency reporting directly to the president, with one mission: delivering a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.
This would not weaken civilian control; in fact, it would strengthen presidential accountability on nuclear developments. Moving NNSA out of DOE could also help clarify the confusing web of congressional oversight in place now. For example, NNSA is authorized by the Armed Services Committees, where deterrence strategy and force posture are debated, but funded through the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittees, alongside civilian energy, and environmental programs. And we agree with the recommendation of the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States that NNSA should be funded through the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, which is focused solely on defense and national security issues..
Presidents are remembered for decisive action at moments of danger. Truman reshaped national security after World War II. Reagan restored deterrence at the height of the Cold War. If Trump fixes America’s nuclear weapons governance, he will be remembered as the president who secured the nuclear foundation of U.S. power for the 21st century, send an unmistakable message to Moscow and Beijing that America is serious about deterrence again.
That is a legacy no one else has claimed. And the moment to act is now.
Franklin C. Miller served for decades as a senior policy official in the Department of Defense and on the NSC staff. He was a member of the Mies-Augustine Commission and the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.
Frank A. Rose is a former Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, a professional staff member on the House Committee on Armed Services, and a policy official at the Department of Defense
