The ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Maritime Cooperation, adopted at the 48th Summit in Cebu on May 8, 2026, referred to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) no fewer than 18 times, reaffirming the key principles of peace and stability, the peaceful settlement of disputes and compliance with UNCLOS.
Yet ASEAN has never officially recognized the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award issued by an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS – the very convention that ASEAN itself has repeatedly affirmed as the comprehensive legal framework governing all activities at sea.
July 2026 marks the 10th anniversary of the arbitral ruling in favor of the Philippines in its case against China concerning the South China Sea. How will ASEAN respond to this important legal milestone?
ASEAN’s Historical Response to the 2016 Award
Immediately after the 2016 South China Sea award, ASEAN failed to forge a unified stance. At the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (AMM) held in Vientiane, just two weeks after the judgment, member states could not reach a consensus to include any direct reference to the ruling in the joint communiqué. According to Philippine officials, every proposed reference was vetoed by a member state without explanation or counter-proposal. The same pattern reappeared at the 30th ASEAN Summit in Manila in 2017 and in subsequent years. Nearly a decade on, ASEAN is still struggling to reach any consensus regarding the 2016 award.
Any attempts to predict ASEAN’s response require an examination of how its member states have engaged with the award over the past decade. Given ASEAN’s consensus-based principle, the collective reflects the national interest and policy preferences of individual members.
The sharp divergence among ASEAN member states can broadly be categorized into three groups. The first consists of countries that have openly aligned themselves with China’s position, namely Cambodia and Laos, and to a lesser extent Thailand. Cambodia openly opposed the ruling and vowed to oppose any ASEAN statement endorsing it. As ASEAN chair in 2016, Laos maintained formal neutrality in order to fulfill its responsibilities, yet remained supportive of Beijing’s rejection. Thailand issued a statement on July 12, 2016, that meticulously avoided the words “ruling,” “award,” or “tribunal.” Many observers grouped Thailand alongside Laos and Cambodia, arguing that it displayed a tendency to tilt toward Beijing in pursuit of defense procurement deals and infrastructure investments.
The second group supported or invoked the award to varying degrees, including Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and later the Philippines. Vietnam adopted the most positive stance within ASEAN, officially “welcoming” the award, and regularly drawn upon the tribunal’s legal findings to defend its own maritime rights and sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.
Indonesia initially responded by calling for restraint and respect for international law. However, in May 2020, Jakarta submitted a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General that effectively accepted the award’s conclusion showing that the “nine-dash line” has no legal basis.
Malaysia, maintaining its policy of “quiet diplomacy,” avoided direct confrontation with Beijing while reportedly relying on elements of the award’s legal reasoning in its 2019 submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding an extended continental shelf claim.
The Philippines has followed a more shifting course. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, who took office just weeks before the ruling came down, Manila adopted a notably restrained response and actively downplayed the award while pursuing closer economic ties with China. This approach changed markedly under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who elevated the 2016 award into a central pillar of the Philippines’ South China Sea strategy.
The third is the neutral or silent group, consisting of Brunei, Singapore, and Timor-Leste. Brunei continued to play the role of a “silent” claimant in the South China Sea, avoiding direct confrontation and refraining from issuing any official statement on the award. Singapore stated that it had “taken note” of the award and was studying its implications. Nevertheless, during a visit to Washington in 2016, then-Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reportedly stressed the importance of respecting the arbitration result, drawing criticism from Beijing. Similarly, Timor-Leste, which was not yet an ASEAN member at that time, also avoided taking a direct stance on the award but insisted UNCLOS as “Constitution of the Oceans.”
ASEAN’s consensus mechanism enabled opponents of the award to block supportive language while the supporters avoid public confrontation. Even if there is active support from Vietnam or the Philippines, it is insufficient to overcome opposition and silence from other members. This structural reality explains why, despite numerous ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting and Summits over the past decade, the organization has never issued a collective statement formally recognizing or directly invoking the 2016 award.
Will ASEAN Change Its Response?
The 10th anniversary of the arbitral ruling coincides with the Philippines’ ASEAN chairship in 2026 and ASEAN’s ongoing efforts to conclude an “effective and substantive” Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea. Will that see any change in the bloc’s approach to the award?
The most likely scenario is that ASEAN will continue to face a collective dilemma in reaching consensus on any statement related to the 2016 award. After all, this pattern has remained unchanged for the past decade.
The second possibility is that the Philippines, as ASEAN chair, may promote stronger language in the Chair’s Statement or the Joint Communiqué of the 59th AMM, scheduled for July 21, 2026. While a direct reference to the 2016 award would remain politically difficult, ASEAN could adopt firmer wording, emphasizing the need to “fully respect legal processes undertaken in accordance with UNCLOS.” This would set a linguistic precedent for future ASEAN statements. In the short term, it would not immediately change China’s behavior; however, it could increase the long-term reputational cost of non-compliance with international law.
The least likely scenario is a collective ASEAN statement formally recognizing or endorsing the 2016 award. ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making process makes such an outcome highly improbable. At the present, there is little evidence that the strategic calculations of member states are shifting in that direction. This situation is unlikely to change unless pro-China alignments within ASEAN weaken, member states reduce economic dependence on China, or Beijing takes actions that are widely perceived as crossing a political and diplomatic “red line” that compels a unified ASEAN response. Yet what exactly constitutes such a threshold remains unclear, making the prospect of a collective endorsement of the award remote for the foreseeable future.
What ASEAN’s Continued Silence Means
The 10th anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award comes at a particularly precarious moment. China’s coercive activities in the South China Sea have not receded but have steadily increased. ASEAN’s silence sends a disturbing message that a major power can simply ignore a binding ruling issued by an international tribunal established through accepted legal procedures, without paying significant political or diplomatic costs. This impression may contribute to the perception that international law is only effective when the interests of powerful states are not at stake, which would erode not only the authority of the award itself but also the wider credibility of the rules-based international order.
Meanwhile, the 2026 deadline for concluding the COC, jointly endorsed by ASEAN and China in 2023, is approaching, and doubts about its completion continue to grow. Wu Shicun, chair of the Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance, has argued that the COC is unlikely to be finalized during the Philippines’ chairmanship. One major obstacle is the continuing disagreement over the relevance of the 2016 award. Manila is expected to emphasize its legal principles and findings associated with the ruling, while Beijing is opposed to any attempt to link the COC with the process or its conclusions. As ASEAN continues to avoid mentioning the award to preserve internal consensus or appease Beijing, the COC process may remain incomplete.
The significance of the 10th anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award lies not in its ability to transform the dispute itself, but in its capacity to compel all relevant actors to reassess their positions within a regional environment that has changed dramatically since 2016. Although the award has not altered China’s behavior on the ground, it has profoundly reshaped the language, argument, and legal framework of the South China Sea debate.
Ultimately, ASEAN’s response to this anniversary will reflect a contest of legitimacy between two opposing views: one that “might makes right,” and the other that international law, despite lacking robust enforcement mechanisms, remains one of the few instruments available to small and medium-sized states in their interactions with major powers. Whether ASEAN should formally speak out on the 2016 award remains a matter of debate. However, regardless of the approach chosen, ASEAN must find the most effective way to define its own role and credibility as a champion of a rules-based regional order in the years ahead.
