Last month, the United States changed the name of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to just Pacific Command, a reversal from its 2018 decision. Back in 2018, Washington was continuing its “pivot to Asia” and developing institutional embeddedness in the context of its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy. This effort was embodied by the Quad, which began on the foreign minister track in 2019 and finally elevated to leader level summits in 2021.
However, the priorities of the second Trump administration have shifted radically from those of Trump’s first administration, causing rising distrust among Indo-Pacific allies. Against that backdrop, the return to a purely Pacific Command reinforced concerns that the United States is uninterested in the Indo-Pacific. The diminishing of U.S. influence, coupled with China’s economic rise, increases China’s potential to become a regional hegemon.
But the other regional powers will have a say in future developments, and they have been busy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is currently wrapping up a three-country tour of Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung visited India and Vietnam in April and is in Mongolia at the moment. Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae visited Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea in May, and India in the first week of July. The packed diplomatic calendar is a reminder that we must also consider how these countries are trying to deter China – even without the United States.
Can these countries, all with significant ties with the United States, collectively deter China themselves, minus U.S. involvement?
The honest answer is a qualified no. What Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and Indonesia can already do together is deter by denial at sea. These five countries sit astride the First Island Chain, as well as the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits – the sea lanes carrying most of China’s energy imports. Japan is fielding counterstrike missiles on a defense budget reaching 2 percent of GDP. Seoul plans to lift its defense spending from 2.3 to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035 on top of one of the world’s most productive defense industries. India can keep a large share of Chinese forces pinned on the Himalayan frontier while exporting BrahMos batteries to Jakarta.
What they cannot do, minus the United States, is deter a major war. There is no mutual defense obligation among any of the five, no unified command, no shared war plan, and no substitute for U.S. extended nuclear deterrence over Tokyo and Seoul. South Korea’s forces, in any case, remain fixed on Pyongyang.
This suggests that cooperation should start from four primary areas. First, maritime domain awareness. A shared operating picture across two oceans is the most cost-effective way to achieve collective capability.
Second, logistics and access. Widen the web of reciprocal access and mutual logistics agreements so ports, airfields and fuel are usable during a crisis.
Third, defense-industrial co-production. This is already underway. Korean K9 guns are being built in India as the Vajra, while Hanwha is delivering Huntsman howitzers and Redback vehicles to Australia. Australia’s first Japanese-built Mogami frigate is expected to arrive in 2029 with a shipbuilding base planned.
Fourth, collective resilience against economic coercion. Economic dependence is Beijing’s true battleground, meaning these partners must achieve a level of independence in the critical mineral supply chain.
Deterring China together will require an institutional apparatus developed by these countries, bilaterally and multilaterally. As of now, the institutional framework is uneven.
Australia-Japan forms the core, with a Reciprocal Access Agreement and a Framework for Strategic Defense Coordination, effective from December 2025 across all levels and situations. India maintains 2+2 dialogues with Tokyo and Canberra but not with Seoul or Jakarta. Furthermore the Japan-South Korea relationship remains hampered by historical issues, with intelligence-sharing politically precarious.
As an added challenge, threat perceptions vis-a-vis China vary widely. Tokyo perceives an existential maritime challenge while New Delhi sees a continental one. Canberra views China as a distant but growing threat and Seoul prioritizes North Korean issues. Meanwhile, Jakarta, despite purchasing BrahMos missiles, refuses to identify a specific threat and continues strengthening trade with Beijing.
A calibrated response cannot mean each country hedging alone; it must add up to something collective. India, Japan, and Australia – the Quad minus the U.S. – need to cast a wider net of strategic institutional embeddedness among themselves, and extend it outwards to South Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.
That web, not any single alliance, may develop as the deterrent, even if the U.S. drifts away from the Indo-Pacific.
