Procuring a new submarine fleet has been a persistent problem for Australia’s defense strategy for almost two decades. In 2009, the government of Kevin Rudd commissioned a defense white paper that recognized the need for Australia to replace its aging Collins-class submarines, as well as expand the fleet from six boats to 12. What followed has been a mess of indecision, changing plans, and squandered opportunities. All of this has left the maritime nation, highly dependent on the Indo-Pacific’s sea lines of communication, without the adequate hardware to defend its own interests.
From the initial negotiations with Japan to construct a new fleet, to the agreement with France to produce 12 diesel-powered Attack-class submarines – which was cancelled in favor of AUKUS after work had commenced – Canberra continually returned itself to square one. Now all six Collins-class boats are expected to remain in service into the early 2040s, when the first nuclear-powered AUKUS-class submarines are scheduled to become operational. Submarines that first entered service in the 1990s will be asked to serve for half a century.
This has put the government in a bind. Previously, the government sought to invest in a “life-of-type extension” (LOTE) program for the Collins-class submarines. However, at a speech for the Lowy Institute in Melbourne this week, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Richard Marles announced a significant $7.8 billion refocus of the program.
Rather than replacing major systems across the fleet – including diesel engines and generators – the government will now adopt what it calls a “conditions-based sustainment” approach. Each submarine will be individually assessed and upgraded only where deemed strictly necessary, with priority placed on combat systems, weapons, and sensors.
The stated rationale is pragmatic: reduce engineering risk, shorten maintenance periods, and maximize operational availability during the critical bridging period before the nuclear submarines arrive. HMAS Farncomb, due to retire at the end of May, will instead undergo a detailed engineering assessment, though it is not expected to return to active service for at least two years.
The case for the life extension of the Collins-class submarines rests not only on the delivery of the AUKUS-class submarines on schedule, but also on the expectation that the United States will deliver three Virginia-class submarines to Australia as part of the AUKUS agreement. But the provision in the agreement is that the delivery will only occur if Washington can spare the submarines. It is a massive bet that Canberra is making on something that seems unlikely: U.S. production of submarines is currently experiencing delays, producing submarines at a rate of about 1.1 boats per year, far short of the U.S Navy’s target of 2.2 to 2.3 boats annually.
Australia’s submarine program has arrived at a reckoning that is, as Marles highlighted, the direct product of a decade of deferred decision-making. In a highly political speech, Marles blamed the previous Coalition government’s indecision during their nine years in power, and asserted that the Labor Party were the only party who have consistently been serious about Australia’s national defense, citing a long history of Labor investment going back to the creation of the Royal Australian Navy by the government of Andrew Fisher in 1911.
Outside of finger-pointing, the piecemeal extension of the Collins-class submarines may now be the least bad option available. It is a recognition that this is now what Australia has available to it, and there is a necessity to make it work in the best way possible.
Yet Marles’ speech also offered another potential solution when discussing Australia’s burgeoning autonomous undersea systems. The Ghost Shark – Australia’s pioneering, long-range, autonomous underwater vehicle – represents a genuinely different logic of undersea capability. It is a logic based not on maintaining aging crewed submarines, but on new forms of surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike-capability.
Investing more heavily and urgently in autonomous systems, while maintaining whatever viable operational capabilities the Collins-class submarines can be useful for, might deliver comparable deterrence and surveillance capacity at lower risk and potentially lower cost. The war in Ukraine has highlighted the effectiveness of asymmetrical warfare; Australia may now be in a position where it has to think more creatively about asymmetrical deterrence.
