Volatilities in the global oil market over the past two months are a timely reminder of India’s enduring energy vulnerability. With nearly 85 percent of its crude oil demand met through imports in 2025-26, the case for electrification has never been more urgent.
But the transition to clean energy technologies presents a different challenge of securing reliable access to critical raw materials. As India expands its critical minerals partnerships, the discourse must pivot to two key questions: (i) Is the race to secure critical raw materials underpinned by demand certainty for end-use technologies? (ii) How are these mineral partnerships translating to actual projects?
India’s ambitions are significant: 30 percent EV share and 500 GW of non-fossil energy capacity by 2030, and 60 percent non-fossil capacity by 2035 after surpassing its earlier 50 percent target in 2025. These milestones are anchored in the need for reliable supply chains and access to minerals.
The country is 100 percent import-dependent on lithium, nickel, and cobalt. The scale of what is required is sobering: India’s lithium-ion battery demand for EVs was around 10 GWh in 2024. By 2040, UC Davis projections suggest this could surge to between 422 and 698 GWh. To sustain this growth, annual demand for battery minerals is expected to rise to 1,075–1,777 kilotons, a 46 to 66 times increase from 2024 levels.
Moreover, without domestic production of clean energy technologies, including battery cells, the mineral demand will not directly accrue to India, adding to the complexities of supply chain risk management. While the EV transition may reduce exposure to oil shocks at end use, it will not eliminate external dependence of supply chains, only shifting it from fuel to battery.
A Strategic Evolution in Expanding Global Partnerships
India’s recent international engagements on critical minerals reflect a growing recognition of this risk. Between 2019 and 2022, the focus was on laying diplomatic groundwork — forming Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL) and signing Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), and initiating early-stage partnerships. Since 2023, the approach has evolved toward operationalization: pursuing direct mining access in Argentina, Chile, and parts of Africa; expanding cooperation in technology transfer and processing with Germany, Japan, and France; and strengthening supply chain resilience through engagements with the United States, Australia, and Canada.
This marks a significant strategic shift, but partnerships do not equal supply security. A review of Ministry of Mines Annual Reports (2020–2026) shows that most engagements remain concentrated at the level of MoUs and institutional mechanisms, with only a limited number progressing to project-level evaluation, and even fewer to concrete exploration or investment agreements. This highlights the distance India must still cover to translate diplomatic outreach into physical material access. Further, without creating strong market certainty for end-use technologies leading to manufacturing investments, lack of off-taker demand and stranded asset risks remain a challenge.
Geopolitics of Critical Minerals
Even if India accelerates its upstream partnerships, the biggest constraint remains China’s dominance over the midstream. With 60-90 percent of global processing and refining capacity concentrated in China, securing access to mines does not guarantee supply security. If raw materials must pass through Chinese-controlled processing networks before becoming usable inputs, the core vulnerability remains.
However, even under favorable conditions, execution is impeded by the industry’s long gestation period. Mining projects typically take 8-16 years to move from exploration to first production. Furthermore, many of India’s resource partners — such as Argentina or Zambia — fall into volatile or high-risk governance categories. A UC Davis study finds that these jurisdictions are often characterized by shifting regulatory regimes, community resistance and infrastructure deficits. The challenge for India is not just signing deals, but also the speed of execution and risk management in volatile jurisdictions.
Here, the parallel with India’s oil diplomacy is instructive, but only up to a point. India managed oil dependency through supplier diversification, strategic reserves, and periodic price negotiation, managing vulnerability rather than eliminating it. Critical minerals are complex. Unlike the mature oil market, where India is a price-taker, the minerals economy is still being shaped. Processing, refining, technology standards and supply chain governance remain contested and in formation. India has a short window to contribute to shaping these systems instead of adjusting to them later.
Aligning Demand with Diplomacy
Another important aspect of critical minerals security remains dependent on demand-side alignment. A significant part of India’s future mineral dependence will remain embedded, i.e., in technology imports manufactured outside the country. Even if India scales domestic battery manufacturing to 100 GWh, it would only meet 14-24 percent of the total projected mineral requirement by 2040; the remaining would arrive embedded in imported battery cells. In other words, dependence does not disappear; it changes form. Whether India imports minerals directly or imports them embedded in cells, the underlying exposure remains external.
In this context, mineral diplomacy cannot be disconnected from domestic industrial policy. Securing upstream partnerships is insufficient if the downstream capacity to utilize those minerals is missing. India will also need to expand domestic battery manufacturing, build refining and processing capacity, and invest in urban mining through recycling. Clear visibility on future demand across end-use sectors is required to turn intent into credible offtake signals and investments across the value chain. These signals make upstream and downstream investments commercially viable and provide the certainty needed to anchor integrated supply chains.
India has recognized that critical minerals are no longer a peripheral issue. They are a central pillar of energy security, industrial strategy and geopolitical positioning. The network of partnerships assembled across different regions is a credible beginning, but diplomacy is no substitute for delivery. The real test of India’s mineral strategy will not be the number of MoUs it signs, but whether it can align demand, diplomacy and domestic capability to build reliable, diversified and integrated supply chains for the minerals on which its clean energy future will depend.
