Acquisition reform at the Pentagon is about to meet a new challenge: the drone gold rush. Already a popular talking point in the building, drones featured prominently in the fiscal 2027 budget. Look no further than the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG), which reportedly has a $54 billion budget for the next five years — up from just $226 million in FY26.
Managing major growth in unmanned systems won’t be easy, and will require different thinking. But it won’t require total reinvention, because there is a model that’s been spelled out over the last year: the Direct Reporting Portfolio Managers or DRPMs.
This new model, which reports directly to Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen Feinberg, has already been applied to three key areas: Golden Dome, key aviation programs and submarines. It’s time for a fourth. The drone funding gusher in the FY27 defense budget will stress test all the Pentagon’s acquisition reform objectives at once. So it’s time to deputize a drone sheriff.
The Feinberg Way
Feinberg is reckoned to be the richest Senate-confirmed official in the Trump Administration (aside from US Ambassador to Italy Tellman Fertitta.) But it’s how he made his money — in private equity and what Wall Street types call “alternative investment” — that makes Feinberg a walking weapon of acquisition reform.
The private equity style is not passive; far from it. Investors actively intervene to shape company operations and future strategy. Take for example, Feinberg’s decision announced in January to commit $1 billion as an anchor investment in an L3Harris spinoff for solid rocket motors – an area of the supply chain which has long caused angst. The venture aims for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) later in 2026, which could “pay back” the public investment, depending on how shares are offered. The department has long had statutory authority to invest, but it’s hard to image anyone other than a private equity hand making such a bold move.
Its notable that the November 2025 Acquisition Transformation Strategy encouraged the Pentagon to “hire top talent from government and industry then turn them loose to make big things happen.” That’s what Feinberg has done with the DRPMs. And again, we see echoes of his private equity background: Current Cerberus CEO Frank Bruno said in a 2023 interview that the corporate environment required “incredible hard work and focus,” yet was compelling for personalities “who want to come into the crazy environment we are sometimes.”
With his trio of DRPMs, it appears Feinberg has found people who are willing to match him in that focus and work ethic.
The first to come onboard was Space Force Gen. Michael Guetlein, tasked in July to lead Golden Dome last July. More an architecture than a program, the high stakes and urgent timeline made Golden Dome the perfect candidate for portfolio management, since adversaries are “very capable of holding the homeland at risk,” as Guetlein said recently. Programs like the Space Data Network got a big boost in FY27, a sign of both the programs importance and, it seems likely, Guetlein’s handling of it so far.
The second DRPM leader was Gen. Dale White, who took on the portfolio of Critical Major Weapons Systems in December. White’s family of Air Force programs is valued at $250 billion, a portfolio to put private equity in the shade. He’s already scored a major success with the B-21 Raider stealth bomber, a program so healthy it was just accelerated.
Yet the size of White’s DRPM staff is a mere 24 people. “Flattening that chain of command has made an enormous impact,” commented White.
Past icons like Air Force Gen. Bennie Schriever, who ran early ICBM programs, thrived on close contact with primes and suppliers. Feinberg’s approach will give White the ability to streamline requirements, test points and contracting — important tools as he tries to get the Sentinel ICBM program back on track and keep F-47 moving towards a 2028 first flight. Acquisition transformation strategy goals such as modernized test infrastructure with less oversight, awarding multi-year deals, and flexible contracting will all help.
Vice Admiral Rob Gaucher is the most recent DRPM, appointed on Feb. 1 to manage submarine programs. He fingered critical materials as a primary cause of delays, and applauded an acceleration program that completed all 26 modules for the nuclear ballistic missile submarine District of Columbia by the end of 2025, allowing delivery in 2028.
But Gaucher’s main challenge is workforce – and it may be the hardest to fix with acquisition reform. Gaucher estimated he needs 70 million annual man-hours to build two Virginia-class submarines and one Columbia-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine per year. That’s up from about 13 million man-hours per year in 2011. Multi-year contracts, new suppliers and, of course, workforce training, seasoning and retention will determine whether production makes its rate. Gaucher and his undersea portfolio got a big vote of confidence with over $13 billion for Columbia-class and $26 billion for Virginia-class programs in the FY27 budget layout.
The Case For DRPM Drones
Given the early returns from the three DRPMs and the money flowing towards unmanned system, Feinberg should move fast to put a new sheriff – any sheriff – in charge of this wild west world. After all, expectations are high: “Our adversaries collectively produce millions of cheap drones each year,” Secretary of War Pete Hegseth stated in July. “I expect to see this capability integrated into all relevant combat training, including force-on-force drone wars.”
Acquisition reform principles offer the Pentagon flexibility on pricing and acquisition. Operation Epic Fury and the war in Ukraine are transmitting operational lessons in real time. If ever there was a moment for Feinberg’s team to apply the hard analysis and gut instincts from private equity, this is it.
DRPM Drones needs to conduct a top-to-bottom review of the counter-drone plan for DoW – before we lose another AWACS or see a US base attacked. For this DRPM, the distribution of roles and missions across the services should also be on the table. And their program should encompass small drones, loitering munitions and counter-drone technologies
Crucially, this person must be empowered to say “no” as much as they say “yes.” There are so many different programs for this kind of technology spread throughout the building already, and not every one is going to make sense when looked at holistically with other programs. And the DRPM will need to oversee the various experiments ongoing to decide what technologies are worth moving forward with. (For example, on Feb. 3, the Pentagon selected 25 drone companies to participate in Gauntlet, a series of tests for small, cheap attack drones).
Also, despite the name, not every drone program should fall under the DRPM. The portfolio should prioritize the loitering munition drones, like the LUCAS drones employed in small batch numbers during Operation Epic Fury, and the Army’s Damocles vertical drone, part of its Low Altitude Stalking and Strike Ordnance or LASSO program. This role can’t try to gobble up mature systems like MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-4 Triton and even the ready-to-hatch MQ-25 carrier-based Stingray, which are all nested with solid operational concepts. Similarly, White has already been charged with managing the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft program.
It’s important to remember that the DRPMs are under time pressure — as with private equity, where cash has just a few years for investment and returns, the exit strategy looms.
“We are actually planning to disband the DRPM concept once we get the momentum and get the capability into the field, and fold that back into the services and into the agencies,” Guetlein said of Golden Dome.
In other words, creating a DRPM for drones isn’t creating a new bureaucracy to embed within the department. It’s seizing on an opportunity now. But unlike private equity, when this effort pays out, it’ll be the public who truly wins.
Rebecca Grant is a Senior Fellow of the Lexington Institute.
