India’s third aircraft carrier remains an elusive project, despite decades of advocacy from the Navy and repeated references in defence planning documents. At present, the fleet is limited to two carriers—INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.
The operational reality is that one of these is often under maintenance, leaving only a single carrier available for deployment at sea. This creates a strategic gap, as experts argue that a third carrier is essential to ensure at least two remain active at any given time, enabling simultaneous deployments in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.
The absence of visible progress has drawn political attention. AIMIM MP Asaduddin Owaisi recently raised the issue in Parliament, questioning the government on the lack of adequate submarines and carriers to counter threats from China and Pakistan.
He highlighted that the Indian Air Force is operating with only 29 fighter squadrons, far below the sanctioned strength of 42, while Pakistan fields 25 squadrons and China 66. His remarks underscored the broader concern about India’s ability to project power and maintain readiness in a contested regional environment.
Reports in 2025 suggested that India had shelved plans for a third carrier. However, subsequent developments hinted at renewed interest, particularly in a nuclear-powered design tentatively named INS Vishal.
The Defence Ministry’s 2025 roadmap explicitly recognised the need for a third carrier, describing it as imperative for India’s future responsibilities. The document proposed a nuclear-powered vessel of over 65,000 tons, capable of longer reach and stealthier operations.
It also envisaged at least ten nuclear propulsion systems to support the carrier and other warships, alongside procurement of two electromagnetic aircraft launch systems—technology already fielded by the US and China.
Despite these ambitious plans, the government has remained silent. The Defence Acquisition Council recently cleared proposals worth ₹2.38 lakh crore to bolster preparedness, yet the carrier was conspicuously absent. Instead, the Navy has focused on inducting more warships and submarines, reflecting a prioritisation of distributed assets over a single capital-intensive platform.
The sheer scale of investment required for a nuclear-powered carrier, coupled with competing demands across the services, appears to have delayed concrete commitments.
Meanwhile, India has moved ahead with carrier aviation capability by signing a deal with Dassault Aviation in April 2025 for 26 Rafale Marine jets, valued at around ₹63,000 crore. The package includes 22 single-seat fighters and four twin-seat trainers.
There are unconfirmed reports of an additional 31 Rafale-M being considered, which would raise the total to 57. These acquisitions are intended to strengthen the air wing of INS Vikrant and INS Vikramaditya, bridging capability gaps while the carrier debate continues.
Strategically, the case for a third carrier remains strong. Beyond balancing China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean, carriers serve as mobile airbases to protect trade routes and energy supplies through chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.
For India, the issue is not just about numbers but about readiness, reach, and long-term influence at sea. Yet, the government’s silence suggests that fiscal constraints, technological challenges, and shifting priorities have pushed the project into the background, even as defence experts continue to stress its necessity.
Agencies
