This marks a significant rupture in the “all-weather” China-Pakistan partnership.
Pakistan and China have long projected their relationship as a cornerstone of regional strategy, built around military cooperation and the ambitious CPEC program under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative.
The corridor was designed to connect China’s Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s Gwadar Port through highways, railways, pipelines and energy projects. Over the past decade, it became the centrepiece of China-Pakistan ties, but it also left Islamabad heavily dependent on Chinese financing and technical support.
Reports now indicate that Army Chief Asim Munir is deliberately stalling the remaining projects, with only 38 out of roughly 90 projects completed. This slowdown is not accidental but part of a broader realignment with the United States and the Trump administration.
Munir’s strategy appears to prioritise Washington’s approval, especially as Pakistan positions itself as a diplomatic player in the ongoing US-Iran confrontation.
By attempting to mediate between Washington and Tehran, Islamabad is seeking to reduce reliance on China and regain strategic favour in Washington.
The United Arab Emirates has emerged as another disruptor in this equation. The Iran-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce has accused the UAE of actively sabotaging Tehran’s integration into CPEC, fearing that Gwadar port could rival Dubai’s dominance as a regional trade hub.
Iran’s planned rail connectivity between Chabahar, Zahedan and Mirjaveh would have linked it into the corridor, positioning Tehran as a strategic hub for trade between China, Central Asia and the Caucasus.
However, progress has been slow, with the rail link only 50–60% complete by 2026, partly due to Gulf obstruction. Munir’s deliberate stalling of CPEC projects has further hampered Iran’s ambitions.
The slowdown in CPEC coincides with Pakistan’s broader geopolitical recalibration. Intelligence assessments suggest that while Islamabad continues to praise its partnership with Beijing publicly, its military establishment is quietly reducing dependence on China.
This shift comes at a sensitive moment for Pakistan’s fragile economy, which has struggled with debt and inflation. Aligning more closely with Washington could provide financial relief and political leverage, but it risks unsettling Beijing, which has invested heavily in Pakistan’s infrastructure and energy sectors.
Despite the slowdown, China has not withdrawn military or intelligence support to Pakistan. The two countries continue to collaborate on advanced defence platforms and coordinate at international forums.
However, the lack of new flagship CPEC projects since 2022 underscores the strain in their economic partnership. The “London Plan,” reportedly initiated in 2019, envisaged Pakistan’s military leadership moving the country away from China in exchange for increased American backing.
By 2022, this plan began to take effect, and CPEC’s progress has since stagnated.
The implications of this shift are profound. Pakistan risks alienating its most consistent strategic partner, China, while betting on renewed favour from Washington.
At the same time, Gulf states like the UAE are manoeuvring to protect their own economic interests, further complicating Pakistan’s regional calculus.
Iran, meanwhile, finds its ambitions curtailed both by Gulf obstruction and Pakistan’s deliberate stalling of integration projects.
Agencies
