Towards the end of the truce negotiations between Iran and the US, Pakistan proposed establishing a joint maritime patrol mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz. This mechanism would regulate maritime traffic in the strategic waterway, ensuring safe passage for tankers and other commercial ships.
On first reading, the proposal aligns with a structural shift in Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially since the May 2025 conflict with India, which is to focus on the security affairs in the Middle East. This is the crux of Quwa’s “Look West” thesis, which posits that the US has encouraged Pakistan to steer its security/military attention towards matters such as counterinsurgency (COIN) in Afghanistan, securing the interests of the Gulf States, and, now evidently, assuming a mediating role in the ongoing US-Iran War.
Therefore, the proposal to ostensibly own or manage a joint maritime patrol mechanism along the Strait of Hormuz aligns with and further reinforces the “Look West” thesis. In effect, Rawalpindi and Islamabad are demonstrating that it is structurally aligned with US preferences for Pakistan’s security orientation.
That said, however, the proposal in its own right does draw on a decade-long effort to not only expand the Pakistan Navy’s (PN) surface fleet and its asset capacity to take on regional sea policing work, but also a real, already implemented regional patrol framework.
In terms of assets, the PN has amassed a fleet of 12 multi-mission surface combatants, each providing a displacement of over 2,700 tons – i.e., the Tughril-class (Type 054A/P) frigate, the Babur-class (MILGEM) corvette, and the Zulfiquar-class (F-22P) frigate – plus four Yarmouk-class (Damen OPV 2100 and 2600) offshore patrol vessels (OPV). The PN had envisioned that the OPVs would be its workhorse assets for regional patrol and sea policing work, with earlier plans for another four vessels.
In terms of frameworks, the PN is already a longstanding participant of Coalition Task Forces (CTF)-150 and CTF-151. In addition, the PN also established its independent framework via the Regional Maritime Security Patrol (RMSP) initiative, which it launched in 2018.
Thus, there was a genuine basis to the proposal, but the underlying concern with Pakistan’s approach to the “Look West” shift is that, frankly, it might be undervaluing its contribution. In a recent Defence Uncut podcast, we argued that Pakistan’s regional security delivery must demand a high ‘premium.’
The recent US-Iran War has exposed the following facts:
First, the Gulf Arab states can no longer, in earnest, trust the United States with their security interests. The US could not constrain Tel Aviv from striking Gulf territories (i.e., Qatar) nor could it stop Iran from freely attacking critical Gulf civilian and economic infrastructure. Putting aside the fact that one can also argue that the US presence in the region precipitated historic tensions into conflict, the Gulf states must live with Iran in the region – the US always has the option to leave. In other words, the Gulf will need to live with the consequences of this war, inclusive of elevated tensions, insecurity, and costs that connect with the loss of investor, expatriate, and political confidence in those countries.
Second, the Gulf states likely understand that investing in their own hard power is critical, fully executing on these ideas is not feasible. Basically, the Gulf states (bar Saudi Arabia) lack the human resources, so they will either need to staff their militaries with foreigners or defer to regional partners for support in the areas they cannot own individually. In both respects, Pakistan is arguably well positioned to support Gulf governments, i.e., restarting the historical practice of feeding retired military personnel to the Gulf as well as sending active detachments or deputized personnel.
