As India edges closer to implementing long-pending theatre commands, debates over force restructuring have sharpened, especially regarding a proposed dedicated rocket and missile force.
Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retd), a former fighter pilot and military affairs commentator, cautions that such a step could fragment command structures rather than bolster them.
Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan has signalled that the Theaterisation plan is nearing completion and could soon reach the defence ministry. Persistent discussions centre on command hierarchies, resource distribution, and operational authority.
The core issue Theaterisation seeks to address is the Indian military’s disjointed framework. Current structures were never built for true integration, making coordination challenging.
Harmonisation must begin at the planning stage, encompassing procurement and execution synergy, such as joint fires. Effective military operations hinge on seamless command and control.
A joint theatre commander should issue orders executed without service-specific doctrinal filters. Presently, silos hinder this.
For instance, tactical radios used by the Air Force and Army appear similar but operate on different software and incur varying costs from the same suppliers. Even in systems like the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), where inputs such as Akashteer integrate, full synergy remains a work in progress.
Theatre commanders will play a pivotal role in enforcing this integration.
The ideal doctrinal foundation for Theaterisation starts with a National Security Strategy (NSS). This must articulate India’s comprehensive national power and ambitions, whether regional or global.
From the NSS flows a overarching military doctrine, domain-specific doctrines, and theatre-specific ones. Currently, structural reforms precede full doctrinal alignment.
War-gaming reveals that service-specific doctrines generate friction, underscoring the need for integration. Challenges are inevitable, with services guarding their territories.
These turf battles appear in rivalries over senior appointments and financial control. Studies of models like those in the US and China inform the approach, but implementation must suit Indian contexts.
The Indian Air Force’s primary concern is the potential fragmentation of its limited air power assets, which perform best under centralised control.
An earlier proposal for an Air Defence Command under Air Force control was functional rather than geographical, unlike the Army and Navy’s theatre-based authority. This asymmetry raises legitimate issues.
Recent understandings mitigate this: strategic assets like Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), air-to-air refuelers, and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft will stay under Air Headquarters for centralised allocation to theatres as needed.
However, with fighter squadrons numbering just 29, arbitrary fragmentation must be avoided. Striking a balance between central control and theatre execution will prove crucial.
Ahlawat firmly opposes creating a dedicated rocket and missile force, deeming it the wrong path. He views it as controversial and likely to complicate rather than strengthen the system.
Instead, a robust joint fires concept under theatre commanders is essential. Rockets, missiles, and UAVs must integrate within a theatre’s Area of Responsibility (AOR).
Carving them into a separate functional command recreates silos. Firepower cannot operate as an isolated vertical; it demands inclusion in integrated operational plans.
The value of these capabilities is unquestioned—India needs more of them. Yet a standalone structure would erode accountability and muddle command and control.
Theatre commanders require full authority to deploy all firepower in their domains.
Implementation faces a clear roadmap. The proposal should reach the Ministry of Defence shortly, followed by ministerial review, especially of financial aspects, with feedback returned.
Post-revisions, Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval is needed. Legislative tweaks—possibly a new law or amendments to Army, Navy, and Air Force Acts—may arise.
This process is protracted. Even after green lights, operational rollout demands time.
Realistically, one to two years minimum before theatre commands go live. Structural definition is key.
The blueprint for three theatre commands—Western, Northern, and Maritime—with cross-service deputy commanders marks progress. Ultimate success rests on doctrinal and operational integration, beyond mere structure.
NIE
