Since 2023, Australia has committed to updating its defense strategy documents on a biennial basis in order to assess changes in the strategic environment and adjust its strategic thinking accordingly. On April 16, 2026, Australia released the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the 2026 Integrated Investment Program (IIP). In this year’s defense strategy, Australia placed particular emphasis on the threat posed by China.
Australia’s NDS explicitly identifies China’s national power and military capabilities as the primary factors shaping the Indo-Pacific region. It also highlights the risks posed by the activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the China Coast Guard (CCG) in international waters, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea.
Compared with the 2024 strategy, the 2026 NDS uses clearer language on China. It not only directly names the regional impact of the PLA and the CCG but also omits the 2024 assessment that China-U.S. communication could help manage disputes.
Based on experience, when policy documents released by foreign governments address the impact of China, Beijing often responds forcefully by accusing Western countries of clinging to the so-called “China threat” narrative. For example, in response to Australia’s 2024 NDS, China’s Foreign Ministry urged Australia to “abandon its Cold War mentality” and stop making an issue of China at every turn. China’s Defense Ministry likewise criticized Australia for hyping up the “China threat” as a pretext for expanding its own military capabilities. Even though the 2024 NDS only emphasized the impact of China-U.S. competition on the strategic environment, Beijing still issued a strong response.
However, despite Australia’s more direct references this year to the impact of the PLA and the CCG, as well as its more pessimistic assessment of the future strategic environment, no Chinese government agency has issued any response to Australia’s NDS. China’s muted reaction toward Australia appears to stand in sharp contrast to its past wolf warrior diplomacy, which emphasized a willingness to “dare to struggle.”
This raises a question: what has driven the change in Beijing’s response to Australia’s defense policy?
China Sees an Opportunity to Influence Australia
Looking back at the current state of Australia-China relations, the two countries are restoring diplomatic and economic ties even as military frictions continue to increase. Since Anthony Albanese became Australia’s prime minister in 2022, Canberra has sought to repair the strained relationship with Beijing that developed under the Morrison government. At the same time, Albanese has also strengthened Australia’s defense cooperation with the United States in response to China’s expanding military threat in the Indo-Pacific.
Maintaining a balanced approach between the two major powers is consistent with Australia’s national interests. However, following Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency, Australia’s defense relationship with the U.S. has come under pressure.
Like other countries with close security ties to the U.S., Australia has faced demands and policy pressure from the Trump administration as Washington calls on its allies to shoulder greater defense responsibilities. During the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth urged Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles to raise Australia’s defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP. In June, the U.S. also launched a review of the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine program. These pressure tactics prompted Australia to demonstrate its commitment to defense by increasing military spending and supporting U.S. shipbuilding efforts. However, they have also undermined Australian confidence in cooperation with the U.S. under the Trump administration.
This erosion of trust has had its most direct impact on Australian public perceptions of the United States. Since Trump returned to office, the share of Australians who trust the U.S. has fallen sharply from 56 percent to 36 percent, reflecting deep distrust toward the U.S. under the Trump administration. At the same time, Australian views of China have become increasingly balanced. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the proportion of Australians who regard China as a security threat has gradually declined, while the proportion who see China as an economic partner has increased. For the first time since 2019, these two views have crossed, suggesting growing ambiguity in how Australians perceive China.
Against the backdrop of declining trust in the United States and growing ambiguity in Australia’s perception of China, Canberra continues to align closely with U.S. policy while also seeking closer ties with Beijing to diversify risks. This has created an opportunity for China to expand its influence over Australia by using diplomatic, military, and economic means to encourage Canberra to adopt policies more favorable to Beijing.
Speak Softly and Wield a Big Stick
This may reasonably explain why Beijing has not publicly criticized Australia’s National Defense Strategy this year. Now that China has restored bilateral relations with Australia, it has little need to issue a stronger response to a defense strategy document that Canberra releases on a regular basis. Doing so would not only risk escalating tensions between China and Australia, but repeated high-intensity criticism of Australia’s defense policy could also diminish Beijing’s influence, thereby undermining its strategy of shaping Australian policy through bilateral engagement.
Building friendly relations with Australia helps safeguard China’s core interests, including issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, which Beijing regards as matters of its internal affairs. China’s economic and trade ties with Australia have long served as a powerful tool for shaping Canberra’s choice of issues to raise with Beijing, thereby reducing Australia’s willingness to proactively press China on sovereignty and human rights concerns.
However, this does not mean that China has stopped responding to Australia’s defense policy. Rather, in recent years, Beijing has expressed its position through diplomatic criticism of AUKUS and increasingly assertive military actions. In its external messaging, instead of directly singling out Australia on defense issues and risking renewed confrontation, China’s criticism of AUKUS appears more aimed at making Canberra aware that participation in the pact could heighten tensions with Beijing, thereby increasing Australia’s willingness to withdraw from multilateral defense cooperation with the United States.
To reinforce concerns that AUKUS could bring Australia into conflict with China, the Chinese military has become a tool for shaping that possibility. In recent years, in response to Australia’s AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine cooperation with the United States and its participation in multinational exercises in the South China Sea, the PLA has tended to assert China’s sovereignty through military actions directed at Australian forces, including close approaches by PLA aircraft and the release of flares. At the same time, the PLA Navy’s unannounced exercises in the Tasman Sea in 2025, along with its circumnavigation of the Australian continent, also served as a warning that China possesses power-projection capabilities. It was a signal that Australia should not cooperate with the United States in countering China.
Conclusion
As Australia-China relations have recovered, Beijing’s approach to influencing Australia’s defense policy has shifted from directly criticizing Australian defense policy to targeting Australia’s multilateral defense cooperation. Amid emerging strains in the Australia-U.S. defense relationship, China appears more inclined to use diplomatic means to shape Canberra’s willingness to cooperate with Washington, while employing assertive military actions to underscore the possibility that AUKUS could draw Australia into conflict with China. China’s decision not to respond to Australia’s NDS this year is therefore consistent with its current strategy toward Australia.
The pressure imposed on Australia by Trump will inevitably encourage the Albanese government, which has actively sought to repair ties with China, to deepen relations with Beijing in order to maintain balance. At the same time, however, Australia also faces China’s active efforts to influence its policy on cooperation with the United States. Under the dual influence of Washington and Beijing, Australia’s ability to balance its security and economic relationships will depend even more on how carefully it calibrates its China policy.
