The jointly developed India-Russia BrahMos supersonic missile might find yet another buyer in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). After emerging as a popular choice among Southeast Asian states grappling with limited defense budgets and China’s expanding maritime assertiveness, the BrahMos missile might expand its footprint into West Asia. Reportedly, India is in talks with the UAE to export its frontline defense technologies, including the BrahMos supersonic missile and the Akashteer air defense command-and-control system.
The UAE’s decision to move toward the BrahMos missile system comes at an important juncture, as the recent Iran conflict has exposed the region’s evolving security challenges. That reinforces the case for more diverse defense cooperation.
The Iran War demonstrated potential gaps in the UAE’s deterrence capabilities. Despite fielding one of West Asia’s most sophisticated advanced air and missile defense networks – including THAAD, the MIM-104 Patriot, and the KM-SAM – Abu Dhabi’s long-range conventional precision strike options are limited, relying primarily on the Black Shaheen.
While it offers comparable precision-strike capability to BrahMos, the Black Shaheen is a subsonic missile that cruises at around Mach 0.8 and is primarily designed for land-attack missions. Apart from the Black Shaheen, the U.S.-supplied ATACMS, which Abu Dhabi operates, is a short-range ballistic missile again designed primarily for high-value precision land attack. The UAE currently lacks a supersonic precision-strike missile capable of engaging both maritime and land targets.
Acquiring the BrahMos would endow the UAE with a credible anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capability against both surface combatants and land targets, thereby strengthening its conventional deterrence posture across maritime and land theaters.
The susceptibility of the UAE’s airbases has been demonstrated in the Iran conflict, as Iranian strikes damaged facilities at Al Dhafra and Al Minhad air bases. The BrahMos would also provide an additional conventional strike option. This would allow the UAE to sustain offensive capabilities even if air operations were damaged, thereby reducing dependence on combat aircraft to ensure conventional deterrence and precise strike missions.
Besides the UAE, Russia, co-developer of the BrahMos, is reportedly considering inducting the missile onto its naval platforms despite possessing an extensive arsenal of indigenous cruise missiles, including the P-800 Oniks, Kalibr, and Kh-35. For the last two decades, Russia had little incentive to induct the BrahMos, as it already fielded a sophisticated arsenal of indigenous missiles. However, the Ukraine war has significantly depleted Russia’s missile inventory, creating the need to replenish stocks swiftly and expand production. The BrahMos could supplement Russia’s missile arsenal, given its well-demonstrated effectiveness against warships and maritime defense targets.
Initially, the BrahMos program was primarily intended as a joint export program with India. The missile was designed around India’s requirements, made to be compatible with Indian warships, aircraft, and indigenous software. But since then, the missile has undergone a significant transformation from the original P-800 Oniks-derived design. It now has a much longer range, indigenous Indian guidance systems, navigation, software, seeker technology, and multiple-platform integration.
Originally, the range of the BrahMos missile was capped at approximately 290 kilometers, to remain below the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I threshold (300 km/500kg payload). As Russia was already a member of the MTCR, this limitation avoided complications that might have arisen from the transfer of Category I missile technology to India, a non-MTCR member state at the time. But since India acceded to the regime in 2016, the conditions have been substantially lifted, allowing New Delhi to pursue extended-range variants of BrahMos for its armed forces and, technically, for Moscow’s as well.
One important point to consider is that the MTCR does not impose a blanket ban; it establishes a “strong presumption of denial” for the export of Category I missile systems to a non-MTCR state, with transfers assessed on a case-by-case basis. To avoid complications, India’s export of BrahMos so far has been limited to the original 290-km variant. However, Russia occupies a unique position. As a co-developer with a 49.5 percent stake in BrahMos Aerospace and an MTCR member, it is not merely a buyer but a partner.
Consequently, if Moscow proceeds with this acquisition, it could potentially field one of the extended-range BrahMos variants, developed after India acceded to the MTCR, that might now exceed 400 km, with suggestions that future iterations could feature an 800-km variant. Given Russia’s unique position, whether it manufactures the missile domestically, inducts it through a joint venture, or uses a hybrid production model will depend on the arrangement governing the joint program, which has not been publicly disclosed. But whatever the outcome, it is likely to differ from the typical export standards for BrahMos missiles supplied to other countries.
Although no orders for the BrahMos from Russia have been placed yet, a Russian induction would acknowledge the success this joint venture has achieved. Having already found buyers in Southeast Asia and potentially in the UAE, its adoption by one of the world’s leading missile powers would reinforce the BrahMos’ credibility and reputation in the global defense market.
Amidst this growing fanfare around the BrahMos and the impressive growth of its defense-industrial capabilities, India, however, still lacks an extensive network of overseas maintenance hubs, the logistic networks and support architecture that established defense exporters like the United States or France provide to their buyers. This limits India’s ability to extend comprehensive support. India’s Brahmos exports also suffer from these shortcomings.
Unlike experienced traditional suppliers that provide a well-established ecosystem of institutionalized training, spare parts, software upgrade options, depot maintenance, and overall operational support, India’s defense export industry remains largely platform-centric. The delivery of individual systems is prioritized over integrated support systems. Consequently, prospective buyers may face uncertainties about integration with their existing defense architecture and supply chain, as well as the timely availability of critical spare parts during crises.
Prospective BrahMos operators such as the UAE and Indonesia, and confirmed buyers such as the Philippines and Vietnam, maintain diversified military arsenals with defense systems purchased from multiple partners. While the BrahMos is commendable for its speed and precision-strike capability, its effectiveness will also be tested by how seamlessly it integrates with the buyer’s existing command and control networks and the broader defense ecosystem. Ensuring such sophisticated interoperability will require continued technical support, software upgrades, maintenance, and training – all areas where established exporters already have an edge, and India is still in the process of cultivating the same.
In the long run, the BrahMos’ future as India’s flagship defense export will hinge not only on its technical capabilities but also on New Delhi’s capability to provide sustained life-cycle and institutional support to its buyers.
